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C
asadevalletal.(1)argueforthevalueofthescientiﬁcﬁndings
of gain-of-function experiments to render avian inﬂuenza vi-
ruses transmissible in ferrets and further argue that the value of
thisknowledgeshouldbeweighedagainstthequantiﬁablerisk(2)
that such experiments might lead to an accidental pandemic.
HereinIcontendthatthescientiﬁcorepistemicgainfromsuch
experiments is limited by several factors, and I question whether
such knowledge can carry substantial weight in a risk-beneﬁt as-
sessment where the risks to life and health are large, as they are in
the case of potential pandemic pathogen creation.
Modiﬁcation of an avian inﬂuenza A/H5N1 virus (referred to
here as H5N1) to achieve respiratory droplet transmission in fer-
rets is a proof by example that such transmission is possible. This
isindeedapieceofnewscientiﬁcknowledgewithrelevancetothe
more pressing question of whether efﬁcient respiratory droplet
transmission in humans is possible for strains closely related to
existingavianH5N1.However,thescopeofthenewknowledgeis
restricted for two reasons.
The ﬁrst is limitations of the ferret model, compounded by small
samplesizes.Theadequacyofanimalmodelsforhumandiseasephe-
notypeshascomeundergrowingcriticisminrecentyears(3–5).Spe-
ciﬁcally, the quantitative correspondence between respiratory drop-
lettransmissioninferretsunderpreciselaboratoryconditionsonone
hand and human-to-human transmission in the ﬁeld on the other is
uncertain (6). Relatively few of the possible inﬂuenza virus strains of
interest have been tested in the ferret model, making the generality
of any relationship a matter of speculation and the quantitative cor-
respondence unknown. For example, there are only a few inferred
examples of human-to-human transmission of inﬂuenza virus
A/H7N9 by any route, yet isolates from human cases were transmit-
tedwithmoderateorhighefﬁciencyinthreelaboratoryferretstudies
(7–9).Strongerscientiﬁcclaims,suchastheexistenceofaminimalset
of mutations to confer transmissibility, have been asserted (10) but
are not supported by statistically sound evidence, which would be
arguably prohibitive to gather due to the large numbers of experi-
mental animal pairs required (16).
The second is the generality of results. The generalizability of
ﬁndings in a single inﬂuenza virus A/H5N1 isolate to other vari-
antsofinﬂuenzavirusA/H5N1—andindeedotherinﬂuenzavirus
Asubtypes—isuncertain.Introducingthemutationsobservedby
Imaietal.(11)andHerfstetal.(17)intoadifferentinﬂuenzavirus
A/H5N1 isolate did not change sialic acid receptor speciﬁcity in
the same way as in the variants used by those authors (13). More
generally, epistatic interactions that modify the phenotypic or ﬁt-
ness effect of mutations depending on their genetic context are
frequentininﬂuenzavirus(2,18),includingforotherlocideemed
important in the gain-of-function studies (10), such as the PB2
E627K mutation (12). The molecular Koch’s postulates proposed
by Falkow (14) were, as Casadevall et al. state (1), a tremendous
step forward for the ﬁeld. In the presence of very strong epistatic
interactions, it seems that there may be a need to add to these
postulates some consideration of the generalizability of a pheno-
type within a microbial species or clade.
A separate issue reﬂects the difference between the high stan-
dards for certainty that are appropriately required for scientiﬁc
claims in microbiology and the requirements for evidence-based
policy-making that routinely require decision-making under un-
certainty.Itistruethatbeforethegain-of-function(GOF)studies
withH5N1,someexpertshypothesizedthatthisviruscouldnotbe
modiﬁed to be transmitted in mammals. The GOF experimental
results deﬁnitively prove this hypothesis wrong. Scientiﬁcally, the
scope of our knowledge has grown and the scope of our uncer-
tainty correspondingly narrowed, at least for ferrets.
From a decision maker’s perspective, that additional scientiﬁc
evidence can do little to alter the choice of policies. When the
potential for transmissibility of H5N1 in ferrets was unknown, a
responsible and rational decision maker would have had to con-
siderthepossibilitythatH5N1couldbecomepandemic,notwith-
standing the existence of an untested hypothesis that it could not.
Indeed,theUnitedStates,forexample,stockpiledvaccinesagainst
this eventuality. Following the GOF experiments, we know that
one variant of H5N1, with a small number of mutations, can be
transmitted in ferrets. The responsible and rational decision
maker is in nearly the same position, still needing to plan for the
possibility of a pandemic from H5N1, perhaps with slightly
greater urgency, but still uncertain whether any H5N1 strain has
the capacity to evolve into a human-to-human-transmitted
pathogen. Science proceeds by answering precisely deﬁned ques-
tions with a high level of certainty—in this case the question of
whether a particular strain of H5N1 can be modiﬁed with a small
number of mutations to become transmissible in ferrets under
laboratory conditions. Policy must consider much “messier”
questions that cannot be answered with such certainty—what are
the chances that any H5N1 variant will evolve in nature (perhaps
throughmajorchangesinvolvingreassortment)tobecomereadily
transmissible in humans under ﬁeld conditions? From a policy
maker’s perspective, the answer to this question is only modestly
clearer than it was before the GOF experiments, and it is difﬁcult
to imagine how it could become signiﬁcantly clearer with any
practicable number of future such experiments.
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Casadevall et al. They state that the epistemic beneﬁt of answering a
scientiﬁcquestionwithcertaintymustbeweighedagainsttherisksto
life and health posed by the possibility of accidental or deliberate
release of a potential pandemic pathogen. This is a strong claim in
bioethics, and it raises an essential question that has not been well
addressedinresearchethicsingeneral:canarisktothelifeandhealth
of large numbers of people ever be balanced by the beneﬁt of pure
scientiﬁc knowledge? Casadevall et al. note that researchers place
themselves (and, one could add, sometimes their unknowing col-
leagues [15]) at risk whenever they work with dangerous pathogens,
evennontransmissibleones.However,thescaleofriskfromapoten-
tial pandemic pathogen is much greater than the occupational risk
runbythosewhoworkwithdangerous,nontransmissiblepathogens.
Moreover, it could be argued that the voluntary nature of the risk
undertaken by such researchers places it in a different category from
the pandemic risk imposed on uninformed, unconsenting persons
who may be geographically and culturally remote from the scientists
undertaking the experiments. In clinical studies that deliberately
placeenrolledhumansathealthorliferisk,generallyacceptedethical
principles state that the beneﬁts of such studies must be humanitar-
ian, not merely scientiﬁc, and must be unachievable by safer means.
In the relatively uncharted ethics of research that places unspeciﬁed
humans at such risk, it has been argued that the same principles
shouldapply(2),whichwouldimplythatthepureepistemicvalueof
PPP (pathogens with pandemic potential) experiments could not
outweigh the risks of pandemic release. The contention that epis-
temic beneﬁts might carry such signiﬁcant weight requires an argu-
ment for why the model of research placing identiﬁed human sub-
jects at risk should not be extended to research placing unidentiﬁed
ones at risk.
Finally, in a world of scarce resources for science, it is essential to
judge the epistemic value of a particular experimental program in
comparison to that of alternative experimental programs. The ques-
tionisnotwhetherGOF/PPPexperimentshaveepistemicvalue;they
surely do. But so do other experimental approaches that compete
with GOF/PPP experiments for resources. Doing GOF/PPP experi-
ments has an opportunity cost. In choosing how to allocate limited
scientiﬁc resources, the question is whether the beneﬁts of the GOF/
PPP approach exceed those of other approaches (including GOF
studies in safer viral genetic backgrounds) to an extent that is sufﬁ-
cient to justify the unique risks they entail (2).
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